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TEXT MESSAGE SERVICE OF PROCESS— 
NO LOL MATTER: DOES TEXT MESSAGE 
SERVICE OF PROCESS COMPORT  
WITH DUE PROCESS? 
Abstract: U.S. courts have been slow to embrace new technologies. This 
is especially true when it comes to service of process. With people in the 
United States relying heavily on cell phones and text message technology, 
text messages offer a unique method for serving process. Text messages 
would be useful for serving a defendant when the defendant cannot be 
located. Further, text messages are sent almost instantaneously and are 
inexpensive. In addition, unlike e-mail, text messages do not require In-
ternet access. Given these advantages, this Note examines whether text 
message service of process is constitutional. It argues that text message 
service of process is not per se unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the current 
technological limitations of text messages counsel against using text mes-
sages to serve process at this time. Assuming that these limitations are ul-
timately fixed, this Note then proposes a legal framework for permitting 
text message service of process. 
Introduction 
 Since the introduction of text message technology, people in the 
United States have readily used text messages as a means of communi-
cating with others.1 Imagine that among the “Hi, how are you?” and the 
“You will never believe what happened today!” messages is a text mes-
sage saying, “You’ve been served.”2 
 In 2008, the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court became 
the world’s first court to authorize service of a default judgment on the 
defendants by sending each defendant a message on Facebook.3 After 
                                                                                                                      
1 Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, 2 (Sept. 
19, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20 
Text%20Messaging.pdf. 
2 Cf. Andriana L. Shultz, Comment, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process via Social 
Networking Sites, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1497, 1497 (2009) (hypothesizing what it would be like 
to receive service of process via Facebook). 
3 John G. Browning, Served Without Ever Leaving the Computer: Service of Process via Social 
Media, 73 Tex. B. J. 180, 181 (2010); Ronald J. Hedges et al., Electronic Service of Process at 
Home and Abroad: Allowing Domestic Electronic Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 4 Fed. Cts. 
L. Rev. 55, 69 (2010). 
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Australia permitted service through social media, other countries fol-
lowed.4 For example, Canada and New Zealand have both permitted 
service via Facebook, and, in 2009, the United Kingdom allowed an in-
junction to be served by Twitter.5 Most recently, Australian courts are 
again leading the way in the integration of new technology into the 
court system by permitting service of legal documents by text message.6 
Whereas Australian courts quickly embrace utilizing new technology in 
the court system, U.S. courts have been cautious in incorporating tech-
nology.7 In 2000, for example, only nine federal courts permitted elec-
tronic filing.8 Although approximately ninety-nine percent of federal 
courts now utilize electronic filing, courts have been even more cautious 
in permitting service of process by new forms of technology.9 Only one 
federal appeals court has considered whether e-mail service of process is 
permissible on a foreign defendant.10 And, in fact, no domestic defen-
dant has been served by e-mail.11 
 The use of text messages in the United States is extensive, yet that 
technology still has its limitations.12 Currently, more than eighty-percent 
of adults in the United States own a cell phone.13 Of those cell phone 
users, the average user sends and receives 41.5 text messages per day.14 
That number escalates to 109.5 text messages among adults aged eight-
                                                                                                                      
4 Browning, supra note 3, at 182. 
5 Id. 
6 See infra notes 192–199 and accompanying text. 
7 Compare Jemella Austl. Pty Ltd. v Bouobeid (No. 2) [2009] FCA 1567, 2010 WL 1533394 
at para. 4 (Austl.) (permitting service by text message), and Browning, supra note 3, at 181 
(discussing service of process by Facebook in Australia), with Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l 
Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1012–13, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that e-mail service of 
process on a foreign defendant was permissible and satisfied due process), and Browning, 
supra note 3, at 182 (noting that despite European courts using service by networking sites, 
the United States has not followed suit). 
8 Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Electronic Filing in the Federal Courts: A Status Report, 
Sensei Enterprises, Inc., 1, available at http://www.judicialaccountability.org/electronic 
%20Filing%206–26–02.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
9 Browning, supra note 3, at 182; Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 58. 
10 See Rio Props., 339 F.3d at 1012–13. 
11 See, e.g., id. But see D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003) (permitting service by e-mail on a defendant whose where-
abouts were unknown). 
12 See infra notes 13–16, 219–246 and accompanying text. 
13 Aaron Smith, 35% of American Adults Own a Smartphone, Pew Internet & Am. Life 
Project, 2 ( July 7, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_ 
Smartphones.pdf (reporting that eighty-three percent of adults own cell phones); see also 
Karen Zickhur, Generations and Their Gadgets, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, 2 (Feb. 3, 
2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Generations_and_ 
Gadgets.pdf (reporting that eighty-five percent of adults own cell phones). 
14 Smith, supra note 1, at 2. 
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een to twenty-four.15 Even though text messages are highly used in the 
United States, they have limitations, such as the inability to attach doc-
uments and the lack of confirmation of receipt for messages sent across 
phone models or network providers.16 Nevertheless, the use of text mes-
sages to serve documents in Australia suggests that text message service 
of process may eventually find its way into U.S. courts.17 
 Service of process by text message offers many advantages.18 Be-
cause they are instantaneous, they provide an efficient means for effect-
ing service of process.19 Further, text messages are inexpensive.20 In 
addition, given the ease with which individuals move around the world 
today, they provide a mechanism to effect service of process when the 
physical location of the individual is unknown.21 Yet, unlike e-mail ser-
vice of process, text messages do not require the individual to have In-
ternet access.22 
 This Note examines whether text message service of process satis-
fies constitutional due process.23 Part I examines how the due process 
standard has evolved from a rigid personal service requirement to the 
modern “reasonably calculated” standard.24 It then examines the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the traditional constitutionally sufficient 
methods of service of process, including those methods codified in the 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. 
16 See infra notes 219–246 and accompanying text. 
17 Cf. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (advocating a balancing test for determining whether 
the benefits of e-mail service of process outweigh the limitations of e-mail). 
18 See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
19 See Jennifer Hord, How SMS Works, How Stuff Works, http://computer.howstuff 
works.com/e-mail-messaging/sms.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (stating that text mes-
sages can be delivered within minutes of sending). Even though delivery of text messages 
is usually near-instantaneous, during times of high traffic, it may take hours for a text mes-
sage to be delivered. Id. Further, if a person is out of range or the cell phone is turned off 
such that the text message cannot be delivered, the message will be stored in a server cen-
ter for a few days until it can be delivered. Id.; see also Text Messaging, Verizon, http:// 
support.verizonwireless.com/faqs/TXT%20messaging/faq.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) 
(stating that Verizon will attempt to deliver a text message for 120 hours). 
20 Kate Murphy, All the Texts, Without All the Costs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2011, at B8 (stat-
ing that sending a text message costs around twenty cents, and that there are cell phone 
applications that permit individuals to send text messages for free). 
21 Cf. New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 
F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that electronic forms of service of process permit 
service to be effected even when the defendant cannot be physically located). 
22 An Overview of Textmessaging, AT&T, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=523 
79&cv=820#fbid=OOajbAXLPgG (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (outlining mobile-to-mobile text 
messaging); Text Messaging, supra note 19 (explaining the various methods to send text mes-
sages). 
23 See infra notes 29–286 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 29–54 and accompanying text. 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.25 Part II discusses how courts have 
recognized the need to adapt their procedures to accommodate new 
technology.26 Part III argues that text message service of process is con-
stitutionally sufficient to meet due process; however, given the limita-
tions of text message technology, it is not currently feasible.27 Finally, 
Part IV proposes a procedural framework for permitting service of pro-
cess via text message should text message technology improve.28 
I. From Personal Service to Reasonably Calculated: The 
Progression of the Service Standard and Tried-and-True 
Methods That Satisfy Due Process 
 The required means for service of process have varied since the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.29 
Section A describes the progression of the standard for service of proc-
ess from the former rigid personal service requirement to the current, 
flexible “reasonably calculated” standard.30 Section B then examines 
the methods of service of process that meet the “reasonably calculated” 
standard, including those codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and the various issues that have arisen under those methods.31 
A. The Development of the Due Process Standard 
 The Fourteenth Amendment requires that U.S. citizens be af-
forded due process of law prior to deprivation of life, liberty, or prop-
erty.32 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that, at a minimum, this re-
quires notice of the proceedings,33 the opportunity for a hearing,34 and 
                                                                                                                      
 
25 See infra notes 55–116 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 117–199 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 200–249 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 250–286 and accompanying text. 
29 Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1877) (requiring personal service in 
an in personam proceeding), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), with 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (stating that service 
of process is constitutional as long as it is reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of 
the proceedings and provide the defendant with an opportunity to be heard). 
30 See infra notes 32–54 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 55–116 and accompanying text. 
32 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
33 See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic 
and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a mini-
mum they require that deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded 
by notice and opportunity for [a] hearing . . . .”). 
34 See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court consistently has 
held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a 
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an unbiased decisionmaker.35 Throughout history, the requirements 
for the manner in which notice of the proceedings—service of proc-
ess—can be provided to the defendant have varied.36 
1. Historical Notions of Due Process 
 In order for a court to enforce a judgment against a defendant, 
the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant and ser-
vice of process must be effected.37 During the nineteenth century and 
the first half of the twentieth century, service of process was directly 
intertwined with personal jurisdiction.38 
 In 1877, in Pennoyer v. Neff, the U.S. Supreme Court required per-
sonal service within the forum state in all in personam proceedings.39 
The issue in Pennoyer was whether a monetary judgment entered against 
a nonresident defendant was enforceable where process was not per-
sonally served and the defendant did not appear.40 The Supreme Court 
emphasized that for a state court to enter a judgment against a defen-
dant, the defendant must be within the state and be personally served.41 
                                                                                                                      
property interest. . . . The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (citations and quotations 
omitted)). 
35 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (noting that an impartial deci-
sionmaker is required in a hearing for termination of welfare benefits). 
36 Compare Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–34 (holding that service of process on the individ-
ual is required to satisfy due process in an in personam proceeding), with Mullane, 339 U.S. 
at 314 (holding that service of process must be reasonably calculated to notify the defen-
dant of the proceedings and to provide the defendant with an opportunity to be heard). 
37 E.g., Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) 
(“In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the defendant), a court or-
dinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant.”); Omni 
Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (“Before a . . . court may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of 
summons must be satisfied.”). 
38 See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724 (“Where a party is within a territory, he may justly be 
subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such proc-
ess against him.” (quoting Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134)). 
In personam proceedings are lawsuits that seek a judgment that is enforceable against a 
specific individual as opposed to property. Black’s Law Dictionary 33 (9th ed. 2009). 
39 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–34. 
40 Id. at 736. Specifically, in Mitchell v. Neff, the plaintiff initiated an action against Neff, 
the defendant, and effected service of process through publication. Id. at 716. Because 
Neff failed to appear or otherwise defend, a default judgment was entered against him. Id. 
at 719–20. Neff’s property was sold under a sheriff’s deed in order to enforce the judg-
ment against him obtained by Mitchell. Id. at 719. Neff sued Pennoyer, the purchaser, to 
recover his property. Id. The Court noted that ownership of the title of the property 
turned on whether the judgment in the first proceeding was valid. Id. 
41 Id. at 722–27. 
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Thus, under the Pennoyer standard, personal service within the given 
state was required to satisfy due process.42 
 After the turn of the century, the Supreme Court began to recog-
nize the rigidity of the personal service requirement and expanded the 
scope of methods of service of process permitted.43 For example, in the 
1917 case, McDonald v. Mabee, the Court stated that if personal service 
was not possible in a given case, the plaintiff should use a form of ser-
vice that is most likely to reach the defendant.44 
 This more flexible standard recognized in McDonald was further 
relaxed in accordance with the expansion of the concept of personal 
jurisdiction.45 In 1945, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that serving a corporation’s agent in a state in 
which a defendant had sufficient minimum contacts to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction was sufficient.46 The Court stated that in-person ser-
vice of process is not necessary; a substituted form of service is suffi-
cient as long as it is reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of the 
pending action.47 Thus, as individuals’ mobility in the United States 
increased, and the jurisdictional reach of the courts expanded over 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. at 733–34. 
43 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). 
44 Id. at 91–92. In McDonald, the defendant originally lived in Texas and subsequently 
left the state with intent to establish domicile elsewhere. Id. at 91. Yet, the defendant’s 
family remained in Texas. Id. The plaintiff executed service by publication in a newspaper 
in Texas once a week for four weeks. Id. The Supreme Court held that service by publica-
tion, in this instance, did not satisfy due process, and thus the judgment rendered against 
the defendant was void. Id. at 91–92. In its discussion, the Court hypothesized that the 
actual presence of the defendant’s family in Texas may have made a summons left at that 
home constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 92. At a minimum, however, when personal service 
cannot be effected, the “substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least 
that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done.” Id. 
45 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). Prior to International Shoe, a 
defendant had to have been a resident of or located within a state in order to have a judg-
ment granted against him. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723–24, 732–34. By contrast, International Shoe 
held that a court in a state has power over a nonresident or non-present individual as long as 
that person has minimum contacts with that state. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
46 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
47 Id. The court stated: 
We are . . . unable to conclude that service of process within the state upon an 
agent whose activities establish appellant’s “presence” there was not sufficient 
notice of the suit. . . . It is enough that appellant has established such contacts 
with the state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there 
gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual. 
Id. 
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nonresident defendants, the requirements for service of process were 
relaxed.48 
2. The Current Test: Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 
 After expanding its notions of personal jurisdiction through the 
minimum contacts standard in International Shoe, the Supreme Court 
explicitly discussed its standards for assessing whether service of process 
comported with due process.49 In 1950, in Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process 
Clause requires that service of process be “reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions.”50 Under this standard, the plaintiff is required to provide notice 
in a manner that a reasonable individual who desired to contact the 
defendant would utilize.51 Further, when there are no methods of ser-
vice of process available that meet the “reasonably calculated” standard, 
the method of service must not be less likely to effectuate service than 
other feasible and traditional means.52 
 Applying the “reasonably calculated” standard to the facts in Mul-
lane, the Court dictated that service published in a widely read newspa-
per was constitutional with regards to the parties for whom the plain-
tiffs did not have names or addresses.53 Where the identities and 
residences of parties were known, however, publication was not consti-
tutionally sufficient because service via U.S. mail was more effective 
than publication as it was explicitly directed at given individuals.54 
                                                                                                                      
48 See id.; see also Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Elec-
tronic Service of Process, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 337, 381 (2003) (noting that Mullane’s reasonably 
calculated test was necessary in light of the expanding notions of personal jurisdiction). 
49 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 315. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 318 (“[W]e overrule appellant’s constitutional objections to published notice 
insofar as they are urged on behalf of any beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are 
unknown to the trustee.”). 
54 Id. at 318–19. The Court stated, “Where the names and post office addresses of 
those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less 
likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.” Id. Further, the Court held that pub-
lication under these circumstances was not reasonably calculated because the mail is a 
more efficient and effective means of communication for a particular beneficiary than 
publication. Id. at 319. 
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B. Traditional Methods of Service That Satisfy the Mullane Test: Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4 and Substituted Service by Mail and Publication 
 There are many traditional forms of service of process deemed 
constitutionally sufficient, including personal service and service by 
publication.55 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have codified some 
of those methods of service of process that meet the “reasonably calcu-
lated” test of Mullane.56 Service of process to initiate adversarial pro-
ceedings is governed by Rule 4.57 Under this rule, an individual may be 
served by: (1) following the state law procedures in the state where the 
action is pending or where service is made;58 (2) serving the summons 
and complaint personally on the individual;59 (3) leaving a copy of the 
summons and complaint at the “individual’s dwelling or usual place of 
abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides 
there;”60 or (4) serving process on an agent authorized to accept ser-
vice for the individual.61 For domestic corporate defendants, Rule 4 
permits service of process by (1) following the state law procedures in 
either the state where the action is pending or where service is made,62 
or (2) serving process on an officer, a managing agent, or an agent au-
thorized to receive service of process.63 
 Because people are more transient than corporations, this Section 
focuses on the traditional methods for serving process on individuals.64 
This Section first examines personal service and service on an individ-
ual of suitable age.65 It then discusses forms of substituted service of 
process: service by mail and by publication.66 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318 (upholding service of process by publication under cer-
tain conditions); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–34 (requiring personal service on the defendant 
in in personam proceedings); infra notes 67–116 and accompanying text. 
56 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 4(e)(1). Although Rule 4 permits the plaintiff to serve the defendant under pro-
cedures permitted by state law in either the state in which the action is pending or the 
state where the defendant is located, these state procedures must meet the Mullane stan-
dard to satisfy the defendant’s due process rights. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A). 
60 Id. 4(e)(2)(B). 
61 Id. 4(e)(2)(C). 
62 Id. 4(h)(1)(A). As stated previously, the state procedures for service of process must 
meet the Mullane standard to satisfy the defendant’s due process rights. See Mullane, 339 
U.S. at 314; supra note 58. 
63 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). 
64 See infra notes 67–116 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 67–104 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 105–116 and accompanying text. 
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1. Personal Service 
 Personal service is effected when a copy of the summons and 
complaint is given directly to the defendant by a third party authorized 
by law to serve process.67 Personal service is regarded as the “gold stan-
dard” means for serving process.68 Because personal service is the most 
reliable method of apprising defendants of the proceedings pending 
against them, plaintiffs often provide notice in this manner.69 Unfortu-
nately, although personal service is reliable, it can also be prohibitively 
expensive.70 Further, it requires that the defendant be locatable, which 
raises problems when the defendant is purposefully avoiding service of 
process.71 
 Moreover, there is some uncertainty as to what constitutes “service 
on” the defendant.72 Some courts have not interpreted “service on” to 
mean hand delivery.73 For example, in the 1983 case Novak v. World 
Bank, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
held that leaving papers near the defendant is sufficient for personal 
service when the defendant is evading service.74 Other courts, however, 
have stated that personal service requires actual hand delivery.75 For 
example, the Washington Supreme Court, in its 1995 decision, Weiss v. 
Glemp, held that a summons left on a windowsill of a rectory where a 
defendant was staying did not comply with personal service require-
ments.76 
                                                                                                                      
 
67 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A). 
68 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (“Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is 
the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.”). 
69 See Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?: E-Mail and (Due) Service of Process, 51 S.C. 
L. Rev. 227, 234 (2000). 
70 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2), (e)(2)(A). 
71 See id. (e)(2)(A); Tamayo, supra note 69, at 234. 
72 See, e.g., Novak v. World Bank, 703 F.2d 1305, 1310 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Weiss v. 
Glemp, 903 P.2d 455, 457 (Wash. 1995); Tamayo, supra note 69, at 234 & n.45. 
73 See Novak, 703 F.2d 1310 n. 14; Heritage House Frame & Moulding Co., Inc. v. Boyce 
Highlands Furniture Co., 88 F.R.D. 172, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Tamayo, supra note 69, at 
234–35 & n.45. 
74 See 703 F.2d at 1310 n.14. Other federal courts have also upheld the sufficiency of 
personal service of process on an evasive defendant where papers were left at the defen-
dant’s door and the defendant was later observed to take the papers into the defendant’s 
home. Tamayo, supra note 69, at 234 n.45. 
75 E.g., Weiss, 903 P.2d at 457; Mann v. Hobbick, No. 49233-1-I, 2002 WL 1402546, at 
*2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 1, 2002). 
76 Id.; see also Tamayo, supra note 69, at 234–35 (discussing the Weiss case in detail). In 
Weiss, the defendant was a resident of Poland and was staying at a rectory while visiting the 
State of Washington. 903 P.2d at 456. The process server spotted the defendant in the rec-
tory, approached him, and stated that he had been served. Id. The defendant did not re-
1938 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1929 
 Thus, under personal service, there are instances in which courts 
will find that service of process is not sufficient because the summons 
and complaint have not been directly hand-delivered to the defendant 
due to the defendant’s elusiveness.77 Yet, leaving a copy of the sum-
mons and the complaint near the defendant arguably meets the “rea-
sonably calculated” standard because the defendant has knowledge of 
the pending proceedings.78 Ultimately, whether personal service is rea-
sonably calculated is a highly fact-driven inquiry when delivery is effec-
tuated by means other than the gold standard of in-hand delivery.79 
2. Service on an Individual of Suitable Age 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also permit service of process 
on a defendant by “leaving a copy . . . at the individual’s dwelling or 
usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who 
resides there.”80 Unlike personal service of process, this method does 
not require the actual presence of the defendant.81 Like personal ser-
vice, service at the defendant’s residence can be expensive.82 
 Moreover, there are complications in defining what constitutes a 
“dwelling or usual place of abode,”83 “someone of suitable age and dis-
cretion,”84 and whether the individual resides at the dwelling under 
Rule 4(e)(2)(B).85 These determinations require intensive fact-based 
inquiries.86 
                                                                                                                      
spond to the process server, and the process server eventually left the documents on a 
windowsill approximately four feet from the defendant. Id. 
77 Weiss, 903 P.2d at 456–57; Mann, 2002 WL 1402546, at *2–3; Tamayo, supra note 69, 
at 234–35. 
78 Tamayo, supra note 69, at 235. 
79 See, e.g., Novak, 703 F.2d at 1310 n.14; Weiss, 903 P.2d at 456–57. 
80 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B). 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 4(c)(2). 
83 E.g., Nat’l Dev. Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 930 F.2d 253, 256–57 (2d Cir. 1991) (dis-
cussing whether the dwelling where service of process was left was sufficient for service of 
process). 
84 Compare Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. v. Chang, 109 F.R.D. 669, 671 (E.D. Mich. 
1986) (holding that leaving service of process with the defendant’s seventeen-year-old son at 
the defendant’s residence was not defective), and De George v. Mandata Poultry Co., 196 F. 
Supp. 192, 193–94 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (holding that leaving service of process with the defen-
dant’s sixteen-year-old daughter at the defendant’s residence was constitutionally sufficient), 
with Room Additions, Inc. v. Howard, 475 N.Y.S.2d 310, 310 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984 (holding that 
an eleven-year-old was not of suitable age to receive service as a matter of law). 
85 E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Perinovic, 152 F.R.D. 128, 130–31 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (up-
holding service on a doorman in the defendant’s condominium complex). 
86 E.g., Nat’l Dev. Co., 930 F.2d at 257. 
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 Courts have noted that there is no explicit definition of what con-
stitutes a “dwelling house” or “usual place of abode” under Rule 4.87 
For example, in 1991, in National Development Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 
the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that service of 
process on the defendant’s housekeeper at the defendant’s New York 
apartment was a valid method of service of process because the apart-
ment qualified as a “usual place of abode.”88 
 In National Development, the defendant claimed that he owned mul-
tiple homes worldwide and argued that his actual residence was his 
compound in Saudi Arabia.89 The Second Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, emphasizing that although the defendant considered his Saudi 
Arabia compound his dwelling, the defendant spent only three months 
of the year there.90 Furthermore, the court held that the defendant’s 
apartment in New York had sufficient indicia of permanence to be con-
sidered “a dwelling or usual place of abode” under Rule 4(e)(2)(B).91 
Although the defendant did not spend time at the New York apartment 
year round, the court pointed to the substantial monetary investment 
the defendant made to remodel the apartment.92 
 In deeming service of process at the New York apartment appro-
priate, the Second Circuit emphasized that it fulfilled the Mullane stan-
dard.93 Specifically, the court noted that the defendant was living at the 
New York apartment at the time that service was left with his house-
keeper.94 As such, service at the New York apartment on the day it was 
served was the method most likely to ensure that the defendant re-
                                                                                                                      
87 E.g., Khan v. Khan, 360 Fed. App’x 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2010); Nat’l Dev. Co., 930 F.2d at 
254; see Jaffe & Asher v. Van Brunt, 158 F.R.D. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
88 Nat’l Dev. Co., 930 F.2d at 254–56. 
89 Id. at 254. 
90 Id. at 257 (“The conclusion that only one of these locations is . . . [the defendant’s] 
‘usual place of abode’, since he does not ‘usually’ stay at one of them, commends itself to 
neither common sense nor sound policy.”). 
91 Id. at 258; see also Jaffe & Asher, 158 F.R.D. at 280 (holding that service of process on 
the defendant’s parents’ home was sufficient because the defendant’s receipt of mail, 
maintenance of a private bedroom, clothes, and phone line were sufficient indicia of per-
manence for the home to qualify as the defendant’s usual place of abode). 
92 Nat’l Dev. Co., 930 F.2d at 258. 
93 Id. (“[S]ervice there [at the defendant’s apartment] on that day was . . . reasonably 
calculated to provide actual notice of the action.”); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (“An 
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process . . . is notice reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”). 
94 Nat’l Dev. Co., 930 F.2d at 258. 
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ceived the summons and complaint, and, if not, it was at least reasona-
bly calculated to provide notice of the pending action.95 
 Courts have also had difficulty determining whether the individual 
who accepts the copy of the summons and complaint resides at the 
dwelling.96 For example, in the 1988 case, Reliance Audio Visual Corp. v. 
Bronson, the New York Civil Court held that service on a doorman was 
not sufficient to satisfy due process because the doorman did not reside 
in the complex.97 Contradicting this holding, in 1993, in Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Perinovic, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois held that serving process on a doorman of the defen-
dant’s restricted condominium complex, who was permitted to sign for 
packages and deliveries, satisfied due process.98 
 Determining whether an individual is of a sufficient age to under-
stand the implications of service of process, and therefore to accept it, 
is also essential to constitutional sufficiency.99 In 1990, in United Services 
Auto Ass’n v. Barger, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
that the defendant’s thirteen-year-old son was of a “suitable age” to ac-
cept service.100 Similarly, in 1986, in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Chang, 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that 
delivery of service to defendant’s seventeen-year-old son was sufficient 
because there was no evidence to indicate that the son was unable to 
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. 
96 E.g., Perinovic, 152 F.R.D. at 130–31; Sheldon v. Fettig, 919 P.2d 1209, 1210–12 
(Wash. 1996) (holding that service on a defendant’s brother at the defendant’s parents’ 
home was valid even though the defendant lived with her boyfriend next door whenever 
she visited home); see also Tamayo, supra note 69, at 239–41 (discussing the issues pre-
sented to the courts regarding the meaning of “resides there”). 
97 See 534 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315–16 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (finding also that service on the 
doorman was not sufficient because “dwelling house” constitutes the defendant’s actual 
apartment, not the tangential areas of an apartment complex, such as the stairs and hall-
ways). 
98 152 F.R.D. at 130–31; see also Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951, 952–54 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(holding that service on the apartment manager was sufficient and rejecting the idea that 
the residence requirement should be narrowly construed to turn on whether the apart-
ment manager lives in the same building as the defendant); Three Crown Ltd. P’ship v. 
Caxton Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that service on the defen-
dant’s twenty-year-old doorman was sufficient to satisfy due process). The court focused on 
the doorman’s ability to sign for all packages, letters, and deliveries for tenants of the 
complex. Perinovic, 152 F.R.D. at 131. The court also relied on precedent of other courts 
that liberally construed the requirement that the individual reside in the dwelling. Id. 
99 See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Barger, 910 F.2d 321, 323–24 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the defendant’s thirteen-year-old son was of a suitable age to receive service); 
De George, 196 F. Supp. at 193–94 (holding that leaving service of process with the defendant’s 
sixteen-year-old daughter at the defendant’s residence was constitutionally sufficient). 
100 910 F.2d at 323–24. 
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comprehend the nature of the service.101 In 1984, however, in Room 
Additions, Inc. v. Howard, the New York Civil Court held that an eleven-
year-old was not of suitable age as a matter of law.102 
 Given the disparate outcomes in cases with seemingly similar cir-
cumstances, it is clear that analysis of service of process under Rule 
4(e)(2)(b) requires an intensive fact-based inquiry.103 That fact-based 
inquiry must be used in determining whether an individual is of a suit-
able age and discretion, whether a particular place constitutes a defen-
dant’s dwelling or usual place of abode, and whether someone resides 
at a given residence.104 
3. Substituted Service: Mail & Newspaper Publication 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has found service of process by mail and 
service of process by publication in a widely read newspaper to be con-
stitutionally sufficient.105 The Court has readily endorsed service of pro-
cess via mail.106 The best means of mail service is certified and regis-
tered mail.107 Certified and registered mail require the defendant to 
sign for the mail, and a return receipt bearing the defendant’s signature 
                                                                                                                      
101 109 F.D.R. at 671. The court noted that from the defendant’s son’s affidavit, it could 
infer that at the time process was served, the son had the ability to read and write. Id. 
102 475 N.Y.S.2d at 310. 
103 See, e.g., Nat’l Dev. Co., 930 F.2d at 257–58; Trammel v. Nat’l Bank of Ga., 285 S.E.2d 
590, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that an individual who is twelve years old is not per 
se a person of insufficient age and discretion). 
104 E.g., Nat’l Dev. Co., 930 F.2d at 256–58 (determining whether the defendant’s New 
York apartment was his “usual place of abode”); Three Crown, 817 F. Supp. at 1051 (deter-
mining whether service of process on the defendant’s doorman satisfied due process with-
out considering whether the doorman “resided there”); De George, 196 F. Supp. at 193–94 
(considering whether the defendant’s daughter was of “suitable age and discretion” to 
accept service of process). 
105 See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by 
mail . . . is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely 
affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . . if its name and address are reasona-
bly ascertainable.”); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315–20 (discussing the constitutionality of service 
of process by publication); see also Tamayo, supra note 69, at 236–37, 242–44 (discussing 
service of process via mail, posting, and publication). 
106 See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (holding that service via publication was void for 
individuals whose names and addresses were known because mail service was available). 
Although the Supreme Court has readily endorsed service of process on domestic defen-
dants by mail, it is not entirely clear whether direct mail service is permitted on foreign 
defendants. See generally Samuel R. Feldman, Note, Not-So-Great Weight: Treaty Deference and 
the Article 10(a) Controversy, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 797 (2010) (noting disagreement among federal 
courts over whether the Hague Service Convention permits direct mail service on foreign 
defendants). 
107 See Tamayo, supra note 69, at 236. 
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is sent to the plaintiff.108 Because these types of mail require the defen-
dant’s signature, if the defendant cannot be located, the mail cannot be 
delivered.109 Thus, service of process by mail raises the same concerns as 
personal service on a hard-to-locate defendant.110 Further, mailing ser-
vice of process through the U.S. Postal Service runs the risk of human 
error, such as misdelivery or loss of mail.111 
able.116 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the Supreme Court has consistently endorsed service of 
process by mail, it has espoused disdain for service of process via news-
paper publication.112 In Mullane, Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the 
Court, said: 
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone . . . is a reli-
able means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that 
their rights are before the courts. . . . Chance alone brings to 
the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small 
type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper . . . .113 
Thus, the very small likelihood that the defendant will actually be ap-
prised of the proceedings represents the Court’s central concern about 
service of process by newspaper publication.114 Although receipt of ser-
vice is not constitutionally required, the Court is concerned that service 
published in a newspaper rarely reaches defendants.115 Because of pub-
lication’s limited efficacy, courts will allow service of process through 




110 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (c)(2), (e)(2)(A); Tamayo, supra note 69, at 236. 
111 Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 67 (citing Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-Service: Ensur-
ing the Integrity of International E-Mail Service of Process, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 285, 
302 (2008)). 
112 See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315–20. 
113 Id. at 315. 
114 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (“[S]ervice by publication 
. . . is the method of notice least calculated to bring to a potential defendant’s attention 
the pendency of judicial proceedings.”); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315–20. 
115 See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 319. 
116 See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 800 (noting that if the names and ad-
dresses of the defendant are known or can be obtained with reasonable diligence, service 
of process by publication will not be sufficient); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318–19 (holding that 
publication service of process was not sufficient for persons whose names and addresses 
were known because they could be served by mail); Tamayo, supra note 69, at 243. Courts 
have also limited the reach of publication service of process to certain types of cases. See 
Tamayo, supra note 69, at 243 & n.116. 
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II. Advancements in Technology and Service of Process 
 Recognizing that the law must keep pace with technology, courts 
have gradually expanded the methods permitted for effecting service 
of process.117 Permitting service of process by new technologies, how-
ever, requires an intensive fact-based inquiry to determine whether due 
process is satisfied by the proposed method.118 Section A of this Part 
examines the decision of the U.S. District Court of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, in New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power 
Generation & Transmissions Co, to permit service of process through tel-
ex message.119 Section B then discusses how U.S. courts have viewed e-
mail service of process.120 Next, Section C considers the courts’ evalua-
tion of social networking sites as a means for effecting service of proc-
ess.121 Finally, Section D observes how the Australian courts have util-
ized text message service.122 
A. The Law Must Adapt to New Technologies: New England  
Merchants National Bank 
 In 1980, in New England Merchants, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York recognized new technology options for 
service of process.123 New England Merchants arose during the Iran hos-
tage crisis when diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Iran were severed.124 
 Because the plaintiffs made several mailings to the Iranian defen-
dants without proof of service and the defendants’ counsel refused to 
accept service of process on behalf of their clients, the plaintiffs moved 
                                                                                                                      
117 See, e.g., New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission 
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (permitting service of process via telex message); 
In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 719–20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (permit-
ting service of process via fax). 
118 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); New Eng. 
Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 81–82. 
119 See infra notes 123–132 and accompanying text. 
120 See infra notes 133–178 and accompanying text. 
121 See infra notes 179–191 and accompanying text. 
122 See infra notes 192–199 and accompanying text. 
123 New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 81. 
124 Id. at 78. The U.S. embassy in Iran was violently seized on November 4, 1979, and 
hostages were taken. Christian Emery, The Transatlantic and Cold War Dynamics of Iran Sanc-
tions, 1979–80, 10 Cold War Hist. 371, 372 (2010). After the embassy was seized, the 
United States placed a total embargo on Iran, froze Iranian assets, and suspended diplo-
matic relations. See id. 
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for an order directing substituted service.125 Ultimately, the court held 
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) permitted substituted ser-
vice.126 In granting the plaintiffs’ motion for substituted service, the 
court ordered that service be effected by telex message in both Farsi 
and English.127 When ordering service of process via telex message,128 
the court noted that there was no precedent for use of this new tech-
nology.129 Despite the lack of precedent, the court noted: 
Courts . . . cannot be blind to changes and advances in tech-
nology. No longer do we live in a world where communica-
tions are conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing clip-
per or steam ships. Electronic communication via satellite can 
and does provide instantaneous transmission of notice and in-
formation.130 
The court further noted that service of process by electronic means 
allows plaintiffs to reach a defendant where physical access to the de-
fendant would be otherwise impossible.131 After the New England Mer-
chants decision recognized that courts should adapt and utilize society’s 
                                                                                                                      
125 New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 78. The plaintiffs argued that, given the strained 
relations between the United States and Iran, Iran had made service of process pursuant 
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) unfeasible. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–
1611 (2006). The defendants countered that the FSIA outlined the only means for serving 
the defendants in Iran. New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 78. They pointed to the fact that 
the FSIA provided no fallback provision for serving process in the event that diplomatic 
relations were severed. Id. Because Congress was silent, the defendants argued, the meth-
ods outlined in the FSIA were therefore the exclusive authorized means to effect service of 
process. Id. Ultimately, the Southern District of New York found that the FSIA did not pro-
vide the sole means for providing notice. Id. (“I must conclude that a substituted form of 
service is not precluded under the FSIA and, in fact, is authorized under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.”). 
126 See id. 
127 Id. at 81. The court’s order for substituted service of process also required that the 
plaintiffs serve a copy of the pleadings on the defendants’ counsel that made appearance 
in court and to file an affidavit with the court’s clerk certifying compliance. Id. 
128 Telex messages are messages sent through a telegraphic network that remits a printed 
copy of the message. See Richard Hill, On-line Arbitration: Issues and Solutions, 15 Arb. Int’l 
199, 201 (1999). Unlike telex messages, faxes remit an exact copy of the message submitted. 
David A. Sokasits, Note, Long Arm of the Fax: Service of Process Using Fax Machines, 16 Rutgers 
Computer & Tech. L.J. 531, 537 (1990). 
129 New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 81. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (“No longer must process be mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive 
complete notice at an electronic terminal inside his very office, even when the door is steel 
and bolted shut.”). 
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technological advancements, other courts authorized various electronic 
means of service of process, including fax.132 
B. E-mail Service of Process 
 The courts’ trend of adopting new methods for effecting service of 
process as technology advances has continued with e-mail service of 
process entering the American courts.133 Although e-mail service of 
process has not been adopted for use on domestic defendants, it has 
been used extensively for serving elusive foreign defendants.134 
1. E-mail Service of Process for Foreign Defendants 
 Courts have reasoned that e-mail service of process on foreign de-
fendants is permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).135 
Rule 4(f) permits service of process on a foreign individual: (1) by in-
ternationally agreed-upon means of service reasonably calculated to 
give notice; (2) by a reasonably calculated method as prescribed by the 
foreign country’s law for service for general actions or as the foreign 
authority directs to a letter rogatory; or (3) by other means not prohib-
ited by international agreement.136 Rule 4(h)(2) authorizes service of 
process on a foreign corporation by any means authorized under Rule 
4(f), except personal delivery under Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i).137 Because the 
1993 amendments to Rule 4(f) urge courts to construe Rule 4(f)(3) 
liberally, courts have interpreted Rule 4(f)(3) as authorizing the use of 
new technologies for serving foreign defendants.138 
                                                                                                                      
 
132 Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007); In re Int’l Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 719–20 (permitting service of 
process via fax, ordinary mail, and e-mail). But see Lim v. Nojiri, No. 10-cv-14080, 2011 WL 
2533568, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2011) (“[N]either service by fax or e-mail is sufficient 
to effect service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 or under Michigan state law.”). 
133 See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002). 
134 See David P. Stewart & Anna Conley, E-mail Service on Foreign Defendants: Time for an 
International Approach?, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 755, 764–72 (2007) (examining the common 
threads in U.S. case law for when e-mail service of process is permitted on foreign defen-
dants). 
135 E.g., Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1014–17 (authorizing e-mail service of process on a for-
eign defendant); Philip Morris, 2007 WL 725412, at *2–3; In re Int’l Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 
719–20. 
136 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f); see also Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 760–61 (discussing 
the provisions of Rule 4(f)). 
137 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2). 
138 Id. 4(f) advisory committee’s note (1993); Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 763. 
In its note accompanying the 1993 amendment of Rule 4, the Advisory Committee stated: 
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 When determining whether to permit service of process by e-mail 
on a foreign defendant, U.S. courts consider: (1) prior attempts by the 
plaintiff to serve the defendant by traditional methods of service; (2) 
the defendant’s use of e-mail for communication; and (3) evasion of 
service by the defendant.139 
 In the 2002 case, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first federal 
appeals court to consider whether service of process on a foreign de-
fendant by e-mail satisfied due process, ultimately holding that it 
does.140 In Rio Properties, the plaintiff, Rio Properties, Inc., filed an ac-
tion alleging that the defendant, Rio International Interlink (“RII”), 
infringed on its trademarks.141 Rio Properties attempted to serve RII 
                                                                                                                      
 
In [cases involving a foreign defendant], the court may direct a special meth-
od of service not explicitly authorized by international agreement if not pro-
hibited by the agreement. Inasmuch as our Constitution requires that reason-
able notice be given, an earnest effort should be made to devise a method of 
communication that is consistent with due process and minimizes offense to 
foreign law. 
Id. 4(f) advisory committee’s note. 
139 See Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 764–72; see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 
(“[The defendant] structured its business such that it could be contacted only via its email 
address. . . . If any method of communication is reasonably calculated to provide [the de-
fendant] with notice, surely it is email—the method of communication which [the defen-
dant] utilizes and prefers.”); Philip Morris, 2007 WL 725412, at *1 (“In its motion for substi-
tute service of process, plaintiff demonstrated that it had attempted to serve the complaint 
on defendants using traditional means. . . . The Court, on the basis of factual representa-
tions, granted plaintiff’s motion for leave for service by fax and email . . . .”); In re Int’l 
Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 722 (emphasizing that the defendant “has intentionally concealed his 
location” in authorizing substituted service of process via e-mail, fax, and ordinary mail). 
One scholar, however, argues that courts consider (1) the extent to which the proposed 
methods of service are reasonably calculated to provide the defendant with notice; (2) the 
futility of traditional methods of service; and (3) the degree to which the defendant has 
relied on e-mail communications. See Colby, supra note 48, at 370–71. Determining futility 
requires the court to examine the degree to which the defendant is hard to find because: 
(1) the defendant’s identity is unknown; (2) the defendant’s whereabouts are unknown; 
and/or (3) the defendant is dodging service. Id. at 371. 
140 Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1012, 1017; see Heather A. Sapp, Comment, You’ve Been Served! 
Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, 43 Jurimetrics J. 493, 494 (2003). In 
addition to holding that e-mail service of process satisfied due process, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Rule 4(f)(3) is not a fallback provision, and, in fact, is as favorable as service 
under Rule 4(f)(1). Id. at 1015 (“[E]xamining the language and structure of Rule 4(f) and 
the accompanying advisory committee notes, we are left with the inevitable conclusion that 
service of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither a ‘last resort’ nor ‘extraordinary relief.’”). 
141 Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1012–13. Rio Properties operated a gambling enterprise that al-
lowed customers to place wagers on professional sports. Id. at 1012. Rio Properties had regis-
tered the domain name, www.playrio.com. Id. RII, a Costa Rican entity, was also engaged in 
Internet sports gambling. Id. RII directed its customers to log-on to www.riosports.com to place 
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multiple times to no avail.142 First, Rio Properties located a Miami ad-
dress that RII used when it registered its domain names; however, de-
spite being authorized to accept mail for RII, the international courier 
was not authorized to accept service on RII’s behalf.143 Notwithstanding 
the fact that the international courier was not authorized to accept ser-
vice, the courier agreed to forward the summons to RII in Costa Ri-
ca.144 After the summons was forwarded, Rio Properties received a 
phone call from a Los Angeles-based lawyer inquiring about the lawsuit 
on RII’s behalf.145 Rio Properties asked RII’s attorney to accept service 
of process, but he declined.146 
 Unable to effect service of process through traditional methods, 
Rio Properties moved to effect service of process by e-mail.147 The 
Ninth Circuit held that service on RII via e-mail satisfied due process.148 
In so holding, the court emphasized that e-mail was the means most 
likely to effect actual service of process under the circumstances.149 The 
court noted that RII designated e-mail as its preferred method of 
communication.150 The court further underscored that service of proc-
ess via e-mail directly targeted the defendant rather than requiring the 
use of intermediaries.151 
 Despite endorsing the use of e-mail service of process in Rio Proper-
ties, the Ninth Circuit highlighted that e-mail service of process has its 
                                                                                                                      
bets. Id. Once Rio Properties learned that RII was operating www.riosports.com, it asked RII to 
cease and desist. Id. RII disabled www.riosports.com, but soon after activated a new website, 
www.betrio.com. Id. After the new website was activated, Rio Properties filed the action against 
RII. Id. at 1012–13. 
142 Id. at 1013. 
143 Id. In order for an agent to accept service of process on behalf of a corporate entity, 
that agent must be authorized by appointment or law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). 




148 Id. at 1017–18. 
149 Id. 
150 Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (“In fact, RII structured its business such that it could be 
contacted only via its email address. . . . [O]n its website and print media, RII designated its 
email address as its preferred contact information.”). 
151 Id. at 1018 (“[E]mail was the only court-ordered method of service aimed directly 
and instantly at RII, as opposed to methods of service effected through intermediaries 
. . . .”). Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly note in its rationale the fact that the 
plaintiff had attempted to serve process through multiple means prior to moving for sub-
stituted service by e-mail, it may have factored into its decision. See id. at 1013. 
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limitations.152 The first limitation is the lack of confirmation that a de-
fendant received the e-mail.153 Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
there may be difficulties in appending exhibits and attachments in some 
circumstances.154 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that grant-
ing service of process by e-mail required fact-based inquiry whereby 
courts balance e-mail’s limitations with its benefits.155 
2. Trend Toward E-mail Service of Process on Individuals in the United 
States 
 Although courts have not permitted service of process via e-mail 
within the United States, a few states have adopted service of process 
statutes that would permit e-mail service of process in limited circum-
stances.156 In 2004, South Carolina enacted the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act, which contains provisions specifically addressing elec-
tronic service of process.157 Section 26-6-190 of the South Carolina law 
permits e-mail service of process on corporations, partnerships, and 
unincorporated associations.158 In order for an e-mail to constitute 
valid service of process in South Carolina, it must be postmarked by the 
U.S. Postal Service and must be sent to an e-mail address registered 
with the South Carolina Secretary of State.159 Section 26-6-195 also 
                                                                                                                      
152 Id. at 1018–19; see also Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 788–92 (noting that e-
mail service of process on foreign defendants raises concerns about reliable confirmation 
of receipt, the enforcement of resulting judgments, and the location of the defendant). 
153 Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (“[W]e leave it to the discretion of the district court to balance the limitations of 
email service against its benefits in any particular case.”). 
156 See Jeremy A. Colby, E-SOP’s Fables: Recent Developments in Electronic Service of Process, J. 
Internet L., June 2006, at 3, 7–9. 
157 S.C. Code Ann. § 26-6-190 (2007). The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act deals 
with electronic signatures and commerce. Colby, supra note 156, at 7. 
158 S.C. Code Ann. § 26-6-190; Colby, supra note 156, at 8. 
159 S.C. Code Ann. § 26-6-190; see also Colby, supra note 156, at 8 (discussing the re-
quirements for e-mail service of process on entities within South Carolina). Section 26-6-20 
defines this “electronic postmark” as: 
an electronic service provided by the United States Postal Service that pro-
vides evidentiary proof that an electronic document existed in a certain form 
at a certain time and the electronic document was opened or the contents of 
the electronic document were displayed at a time and date documented by 
the United States Post Office. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 26-6-20. But see Maria N. Vernance, Comment, E-Mailing Service of Process: 
It’s a Shoe In!, 36 UWLA L. Rev. 247, 303 (2005) (stating that the U.S. Postal Service’s Elec-
tronic Postmark service had been shut down but that the U.S. Postal Service was in nego-
tiations to relaunch the service). 
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permits a government agency to effect service of process by e-mail on 
any vendor, entity, or individual that a governmental agency regulates 
or with which the government does business.160 Thus, in certain cir-
cumstances, South Carolina permits an entity with a registered e-mail 
address or an entity doing business with the state government to be 
rve
ause service under traditional methods had prov-
 im
ffect upon individuals in other states will become more 
pervasive.167 
. A
arising from e-mail service of process.168 Some scholars argue that the 
                                                                                                                     
se d via e-mail.161 
 New York has also adopted a provision that implicitly permits ser-
vice of process via e-mail.162 Rule 308 of the New York Civil Practice Law 
states that where service of process is “impracticable” using traditional 
methods, a court may order service in any manner it deems likely to 
notify the defendant.163 In 2004, in D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York permitted service of 
process by e-mail bec
en practicable.164 
 Even though New York’s provision governs proceedings only in 
New York state courts, it demonstrates the potential national reach of e-
mail service of process.165 As Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) 
permits service of process to be effected according to state laws in ei-
ther the jurisdiction in which the court sits or the state where service of 
process is made, entities throughout the United States are potentially 
subject to service of process via e-mail provided that the action is pend-
ing in federal court in New York.166 As more states adopt similar provi-
sions permitting e-mail service of process within their own state, such 
provisions’ e
3 dvantages and Limitations of E-mail Service of Process 
 Given the push for e-mail service of process among practitioners, 
scholars have extensively discussed the advantages and disadvantages 
 
 
160 S.C. Code Ann. § 26-6-195; see also Colby, supra note 156, at 8–9 (discussing section 
26-6-195). 
161 Colby, supra note 156, at 7–9. 
162 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2011). 
163 Id. 
164 D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 4, 2003). 
165 See Colby, supra note 156, at 6. 
166 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1); Colby, supra note 156, at 6. 
167 See Colby, supra note 156, at 6. 
168 See, e.g., Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 66–67; Shultz, supra note 2, at 1512–13. See 
generally Stephanie Francis Ward, Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Net-
1950 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1929 
advantages of e-mail service of process outweigh the disadvantages.169 
These scholars appeal to the extensive use of e-mail by individuals both 
domestically and abroad.170 Moreover, serving process by e-mail is effi-
cient, as it costs little, if anything, to send and results in almost instan-
taneous receipt.171 Further, at least one commentator has argued that 
service of process through e-mail is more likely to apprise the defen-
dant of the proceedings because it remains in the defendant’s inbox 
until it is opened.172 
 Scholars who advocate for e-mail service of process also point to 
the fact that the criticisms espoused in Rio Properties—the lack of con-
firmation and the inability to attach documents—are no longer valid 
concerns.173 Specifically, they note that many webmail service providers 
offer methods to confirm automatically that an e-mail has been deliv-
ered and that the recipient has opened the e-mail.174 Moreover, schol-
ars contend that advancements in technology have eliminated the diffi-
culty of attaching documents to e-mails.175 
 Other scholars counter that, although it is now technologically 
possible to confirm that an e-mail has been delivered and opened, that 
confirmation does not demonstrate that the defendant in fact read the 
e-mail.176 Although the concerns espoused by the Ninth Circuits in Rio 
Properties may no longer be valid in the context of e-mail service of pro-
cess, some scholars remain skeptical of employing e-mail service of pro-
cess domestically.177 In support of their contention that e-mail service 
of process remains problematic, these scholars emphasize that indi-
viduals often maintain multiple e-mail accounts, inboxes have limited 
                                                                                                                      
working Sites to Notify Defendants, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2011, at 14 (citing discussions with lawyers 
about the desirability and feasibility of electronic service of process, including e-mail). 
169 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 66–67; Lewis, supra note 111, at 301–02, 306. 
170 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 66; Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 802. 
171 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 66. 
172 See Tamayo, supra note 69, at 256; see also Shultz, supra note 2, at 1524–25 (quoting 
Professor Yvonne Tamayo). 
173 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 66–67 (highlighting that there is now a free confir-
mation service and that attachment technology is no longer problematic); see also Shultz, 
supra note 2, at 1525 (noting that with the invention of improved return receipt procedures 
in e-mail, confirmation does not remain as problematic as espoused in Rio Properties). 
174 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 67; Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525. 
175 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 67; Tamayo, supra note 69, at 254. 
176 See Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing “You’ve Got Mail” from Meaning “You’ve Been 
Served”: How Service of Process by E-mail Does Not Meet Constitutional Procedural Due Process Re-
quirements, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1121, 1134–36 (2005); Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525. But 
see Colby, supra note 156, at 4–5 (noting that U.S. courts do not require actual receipt of 
the summons and complaint for a court to determine that process was effectively served). 
177 See Schreck, supra note 176, at 1140; Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525. 
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storage capacities, and there is no way to confirm whether an attach-




     
C. Service of Process via Social Networking 
 As technology continues to advance, there has been a push for al-
lowing service of process through social networking sites such as Face-
book and Myspace.179 Australia was the first country to permit service 
via social networking sites.180 In 2008, the Australian Capital Territory 
Supreme Court, in MKM Capital Property Ltd. v. Corbo, approved service 
on the defendants by sending them private messages on Facebook with 
the legal documents attached.181 The plaintiff had made several at-
tempts to effectuate service of a default judgment in person on the Aus-
tralian defendants.182 After matching up the defendants with their Face-
book profiles, the plaintiff petitioned the court to permit service 
through Facebook, which the cour
 Since Australia allowed service through social networking sites, a 
number of other countries have followed suit.184 Canada and New Zea-
land have each permitted service through Facebook.185 Further, in 
2009, the United Kingdom allowed an injunction to be served by Tw
te 6 
                                                                                                                 
178 See Schreck, supra note 176, at 1140; Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525. 
179 Ward, supra note 168, at 14–15; Bonnie Malkin, Australian Couple Served with Legal Doc-
uments via Facebook, Telegraph (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news 
topi -Facebook. 
htm
both of the defendants’ Fa-
cebo ning the terms 
of th
ants by corroborating 
iden  their loan applications such as birthdays, lists of 
friends, and e-mail addresses. Id.; Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 68. 
wning, supra note 3, at 182. 
cs/howaboutthat/3793491/Australian-couple-served-with-legal-documents-via
l. 
180 Browning, supra note 3, at 181; see Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 68–69. 
181 Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 68–69; see also Browning, supra note 3, at 181 (discuss-
ing MKM Capital). The court ordered that service be made by: (1) leaving a sealed copy of 
the court order at the defendants’ last known address; (2) sending a copy of the default 
judgment via e-mail; and (3) sending a Facebook message to 
ok accounts stating that default judgment had been entered and outli
e default judgment. Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 68–69. 
182 See Browning, supra note 3, at 181; Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 68. 
183 See Browning, supra note 3, at 181; Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 68–69. The plain-
tiff used the defendant’s e-mail address to locate her Facebook page. Browning, supra note 
3, at 181. Because the defendants’ profiles were public, the attorneys for the plaintiff were 
able to ensure that the Facebook profiles belonged to the defend
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 Until 2011, no U.S. court had permitted service through social 
networking sites.187 In May 2011, in Mpafe v. Mpafe, however, the Fourth 
District Family Court of Minnesota authorized the plaintiff in a divorce 
action to serve process on her husband through e-mail, Facebook, 
Myspace, or any other social networking site.188 The plaintiff had not 
seen her husband in over a year and assumed that he had returned to 
the Côte d’Ivoire.189 The court stated that although it had considered 
service of process by publication, it rejected it because “it [was] unlikely 
that Respondent would ever see this. . . . The traditional way to get ser-
vice by publication is antiquated and is prohibitively expensive. Service 
is critical, and technology provides a cheaper and hopefully more effec-
tive way of finding Respondent.”190 Thus, the court in Mpafe, recogniz-
ing the limitations of service by publication, authorized service of proc-
ess via e-mail and so
                                                                                                                     
cial networking sites.191 
D. Text Message Service: Australia 
 Whereas U.S. courts have slowly permitted service through new 
technologies like e-mail and social networking sites, Australian courts 
have readily embraced new technologies.192 In fact, text messages sent 
by mobile phones have been used numerous times for service in Aus-
tralia.193 Rule 10.24 of the Federal Court Rules of Australia governs sub-
stituted service of process in Australia.194 Specifically, the rule for sub-
stituted service provides that when it is impractical for a plaintiff to 
serve process on the defendant in the ways prescribed by the Federal 
Court Rules, the court may execute an order for substituted service 
outlining the procedures the plaintiff is to employ.195 Rule 10.24 fur-
 
187 See Mpafe v. Mpafe, No. 27-FA-11 (4th Dist. Family Ct. of Minn. May 10, 2011) (or-
der for service of publication on the Internet). 
188 Id.; see also Ward, supra note 168, at 14 (discussing Mpafe). 
189 See Ward, supra note 168, at 14. 
190 Mpafe, No. 27-FA-11. 
191 Id. 
192 Compare Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017–18 (permitting service of process by e-mail in 
2002 and noting its potential issues), with Child Support Registrar Applicant v Leigh [2008] 
FMCAfam 1424, 2008 WL 5543896, at para. 47 (Austl.) (noting that the defendant was given 
notice of the proceedings by text message). 
193 See, e.g., Yousif v Commonwealth Bank of Austl. (No. 2) [2011] FCA 58, 2011 WL 364929 
at para. 5–7 (Austl.); Leigh, 2008 WL 5543896, at para. 47. 
194 Federal Court Rule 10.24 (2011) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/De- 
tails/F2011L01551. 
195 See id. The text of the rule provides: “If it is not practicable to serve a document on 
a person in a way required by these Rules, a party may apply to the Court . . . for an order 
. . . substituting another method of service . . . .” Id. 
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ther allows the court to specify that once the plaintiff effects service of 
process as ordered by the court, after a given period of time has 
usiness days after the court’s order was 
fulfilled.198 Thus, the Australian courts have permitted service via text 
me
II
e process.201 But, section B then ex-
plains that the current limits in text message technology counsel against 
its w
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. dictates whether a given technology is 
                                                                                                                     
elapsed, the court will accept that service of process has been effected 
irrespective of whether the defendant has received actual notice.196 
 In 2008, in Child Support Registrar Applicant v. Leigh, the Federal 
Magistrates Court in Australia ordered that the plaintiff notify the de-
fendant of the proceedings though text message.197 In addition, in 
2010 in Jemella Australia Pty Ltd. v. Bouobeid, the Federal Court of Austra-
lia ordered that the defendant be provided notice of various court pro-
ceedings through text message and ordered that the defendant would 
be presumed to be served five b
ssages in numerous cases.199 
I. Whether Text Message Service of Process Satisfies Due 
Process and Is Technologically Feasible 
 Although Australia has permitted service through text messaging, 
this technology has not been used in the United States to effect service 
of process.200 Section A of this Part argues that text message service of 
process satisfies constitutional du
idespread use at this time.202 
A. Text Message Service of Process Satisfies Constitutional Due Process 
 Service of process via text message does not constitute a per se vio-
lation of constitutional due process.203 The “reasonably calculated” 
standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1950 in Mullane v. 
 
ake an order that required him to be 
give
g the documents sent and notifying him that those documents 
had
t, 2008 WL 5543896, at para. 47. 
 Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); supra 
note ext. 
196 Id. 10.24(c). 
197 2008 WL 5543896, at para. 47 (“[I]n my view Mr. Leigh has delayed wherever possi-
ble. He quite clearly avoided service that I had to m
n notice of the proceedings by text message.”). 
198 2010 WL 1533394, at para. 4. The court ordered that documents be served by (1) 
posting a copy at the defendant’s residence, and (2) sending a text message to the defen-
dant’s cell phone describin
 indeed been sent. Id. 
199 Jemella, 2010 WL 1533394, at para. 4; Child Suppor
200 See supra notes 192–199 and accompanying text. 
201 See infra notes 203–218 and accompanying text. 
202 See infra notes 219–249 and accompanying text. 
203 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
s 49–54 and accompanying t
1954 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1929 
a constitutional method for service of process.204 Mullane’s standard is 
inherently flexible.205 It is not bound by any particular technology, but 
rather considers whether a particular method of service is directly tar-
geted at the defendant and is reasonably likely to apprise that defen-
nt
vice of process by text message is aimed directly at the 
efe
herefore more likely to apprise the defendant of the 
roc
                                                                                                                     
da  of the pending proceedings.206 
 Text message service of process directly targets a given defen-
dant.207 A cell phone number is exclusively held by an individual; that 
is, a cell phone number is uniquely linked to a particular person.208 
Therefore, ser
d ndant.209 
 In fact, service of process by text message is more likely to apprise 
a defendant of the proceedings than publication service of process.210 
Service of process by publication, which the Supreme Court has 
deemed constitutional, is not targeted at a given individual, but to the 
community as a whole.211 By contrast, a text message to a defendant’s 
cell phone is aimed directly at the defendant.212 Thus, because publica-
tion remains a valid constitutional method for rendering service, text 
messages must also satisfy due process, as they are directly aimed at an 
individual and t
p eedings.213 
 Furthermore, text message service fulfills Mullane’s requirement 
that the means employed to effect service be a means that a person de-
 
e, 339 U.S. at 314. 
hat the Constitution does not mandate 
a pa
cussing how an individual can retain his or her cell phone number when changing 
carr
. of Minn. May 10, 2011) (declining service by publication 
in f
ly calculated if it is not less likely to apprise the defendant than other feasible 
mea
llane, 339 U.S. at 315. 
204 Mullan
205 See id. 
206 See id.; see also Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 61 (quoting Rio Props, Inc. v. Rio Int’l In-
terlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002)) (stating t
rticular method for effecting service of process). 
207 See Local Number Portability, Verizon, http://support.verizonwireless.com/faqs/Switch 
%20To%20Verizon%20Wireless/faq_local_number_portability.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2012) (dis
iers). 
208 See id. 
209 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–18. 
210 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–18. 
211 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382 (“[S]ervice by publication . . . is the method of notice 
least calculated to bring to a potential defendant’s attention the pendency of judicial pro-
ceedings.” (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315)); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–18; Mpafe v. Mpafe, 
No. 27-FA-11 (4th Dist. Family Ct
avor of electronic means). 
212 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382 (discussing that publication service of process is the least 
calculated method of service); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (stating that a method of service is 
reasonab
ns). 
213 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382; Mu
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siring to contact the defendant would use.214 Calling or texting a given 
individual on that individual’s cell phone is a means of contacting 
someone that is used in the ordinary course of daily living.215 In fact, 
with over eighty percent of adults in the United States owning a cell 
hon
f the pending proceedings, and it is a 
means of communication that would be utilized by an individual desir-
ing to co
ion procedure, especially in light of the number of 
ll 
                                                                                                                     
p e, it is arguably the mode of communication that people use 
most.216 
 Thus, text message service of process passes constitutional mus-
ter.217 It satisfies both prongs of the Mullane test—it is reasonably calcu-
lated to apprise the defendant o
ntact the defendant.218 
B. The Current State of the Technology: The Limitations of  
Text Message Service of Process 
 Although effecting service of process by text message satisfies con-
stitutional due process, the limitations imposed by text message service 
of process currently makes its implementation unfeasible.219 These lim-
itations include: (1) the informality associated with text messages; (2) 
the lack of confirmat
ce phone service providers; and (3) the inability to attach documents 
to a text message.220 
 Providing a defendant with notice of pending proceedings is in-
trinsically important to notions of justice.221 The inherent importance 
of service of process in guaranteeing an individual’s due process rights 
are satisfied explains, in part, why U.S. courts have resisted effecting 
 
e, 339 U.S. at 315. 
supra note 13, at 2. 
 at-
tach
25–27 (discussing the limitations and criticisms of service of process through 
Face
noting that due process, 
at a ity to be heard). 
214 See Mullan
215 See id. 
216 Smith, supra note 13, at 2; Zickuhr, supra note 13, at 2. 
217 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–18; Smith, 
218 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15. 
219 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15; cf. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 
1018 (noting that the limitations of e-mail service of process are the technological issues 
with attaching documents and the lack of confirmation that the e-mail has been deliv-
ered); Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 72 (contending that the inability to attach documents 
in e-mails is no longer a valid criticism for refusing to permit e-mail service of process); 
Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525–27 (stating that the lack of confirmation and inability to
 documents are problematic for permitting service of process through Facebook). 
220 See infra notes 221–249 and accompanying text; cf. Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 
71–74 (discussing the limitations and criticisms of e-mail service of process); Shultz, supra 
note 2, at 15
book). 
221 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (
 minimum, requires notice and the opportun
1956 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1929 
service of process domestically through electronic means.222 To the 
courts, electronic service of process does not provide the same ritualis-
c f
edings is integral to notions of “fair play,” 
rv
process is effected, a copy of the summons and complaint must be is-
sued to the defendant.229 Because of the technological limitations of 
                                                                                                                     
ti ormality and finality as the hardcopy traditional methods of ser-
vice.223 
 Although e-mail is used extensively in formal business communica-
tions, text messages have not been utilized in the same manner.224 Text 
messages are more colloquial and lack the formalities associated with 
traditional documents and correspondence.225 This does not affect 
whether service of process through text message satisfies constitutional 
due process, but it exemplifies a reason why courts should tread lightly 
in permitting service of process via text message.226 Given that provid-
ing notice of pending proce
se ing process through a text message may be too informal to meet 
that central requirement.227 
 In addition to the formality concerns, the inability to attach doc-
uments to a text message makes text messages an ineffective means for 
effecting service of process.228 In the United States, when service of 
 
222 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 73–74. 
223 Id. at 72–74. 
224 Compare Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017–18 (emphasizing that the court was permitting 
e-mail service of process on the defendant because e-mail was the defendant’s formal ad-
dress for communications), with Rebecca E. Grinter & Margery Eldridge, Wan2tlk?: Every-
day Text Messaging, 5 CHI 2003: New Horizons 441, 447–48 (2003) (reporting findings on 
the informal terms used in text messages), available at http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm? 
id=642688. 
225 See Grinter & Eldridge, supra note 224, at 447–48; cf. Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mah-
fouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (refusing to 
authorize e-mail service of process because the defendant’s e-mail address was only an 
informal means of communication); Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 62–63 (noting that 
courts have denied service of process via e-mail where e-mail is used as an informal means 
of communication). 
226 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15; Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 62, 72–73. 
227 See Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 72–73 (noting that one of the remaining criticisms 
against electronic service of process is that it lacks the ritual function that only paper-
based, in-hand service can provide, but arguing that the establishment of the federal e-
filing system demonstrates that the federal courts have dismissed the ritual importance of 
paper). 
228 Cf. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (noting that one of the limitations for e-mail service 
of process is an inability to attach documents); Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 72 (contend-
ing that difficulty in appending documents is arguably no longer a valid criticism of e-mail 
service of process); Shultz, supra note 2, at 1527 (discussing the inability to attach docu-
ments in consideration of whether service of process via Facebook messages is constitu-
tional). 
229 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). 
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text messages, sending a text message to the defendant would not allow 
copies of the documents to be remitted to the defendant.230 
 There are three potential solutions for this inability to append ex-
act copies of a summons and complaint to a text message, each of which 
requires multiple methods of service.231 First, the contents of the docu-
ments could be paraphrased in the body of the message and a link pro-
vided that would take the defendant to a copy of the summons and 
complaint.232 Second, the text message could provide the defendant 
with a summary of the proceedings—party names, type of lawsuit, where 
the lawsuit is pending—and notify the defendant that a copy of the 
summons and complaint have been sent to the defendant at a specific e-
mail or mailing address.233 Third, images of the documents could be 
sent to the defendant’s cell phone through multimedia messages in ad-
dition to the text message.234 As text message technology currently 
                                                                                                                      
 
230 See id.; cf. Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 72 (discussing the inability to append doc-
uments in the context of e-mail); Shultz, supra note 2, at 1527 (highlighting the inability to 
attach documents through Facebook). 
231 See infra note 232–235 and accompanying text; cf. Colby, supra note 156, at 10 (dis-
cussing solutions for the problem of e-mail attachments). 
232 Cf. Colby, supra note 156, at 10 (stating that to circumvent the issue of e-mail filters 
stripping attachments or making attachments difficult to read, a text message with a hyper-
link could be sent to provide the defendant with the papers to be served). 
233 Cf. id. (discussing solutions in the context of e-mail service of process). 
234 Cf. id. (analyzing e-mail service of process). This solution poses additional problems, 
however, as it would require that: (1) a defendant’s cell phone have the capability to receive 
multimedia messages, and (2) the defendant’s cell phone agreement permits receipt of this 
type of data. See Support: Picture Messaging (MMS) Feature Overview, T-Mobile ( June 7, 2012, 
10:20 AM), http://support.t-mobile.com/docs/DOC-3310; Wireless Prepaid Plans: GoPhone, 
AT&T, http://www.att.com/shop/wireless/plans/prepaidplans.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2012) (noting that multimedia messages are available for compatible phones only). More-
over, the size of the image may be too small to allow the defendant to read the text of the 
documents. Cf. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (discussing technology problems in attaching 
documents in the context of e-mail service of process); Colby, supra note 156, at 10 (discuss-
ing filters in e-mail that render attachments illegible). 
A critique of each of these solutions is that they require defendants to take a subse-
quent step to give themselves actual notice of the details of the proceedings. See Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 314–15, 319; cf. Colby, supra note 156, at 4–5 (explaining that service of process 
by e-mail requires defendants to take additional steps to allow for actual notice). A defen-
dant not pursuing the additional step required for actual notice, however, would most 
likely not affect the constitutional sufficiency of the tandem service of process through text 
message and another means. Cf. Colby, supra note 156, at 4–5, 10 (contending that ignor-
ing an e-mail containing service to combat the sufficiency of service of process will most 
likely fail because U.S. courts have never required actual receipt for service of process to 
be constitutionally sufficient, and suggesting potential multi-technology solutions in the 
context of e-mail). Although courts have permitted service of process through multiple 
methods simultaneously, a two-step process required for completely effecting service of 
process has not been examined. See, e.g., New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Gen-
1958 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1929 
stands, however, service of process cannot be completed entirely 
through text message.235 
 A further limitation presented by service of process through text 
message is the lack of confirmation that the text message has been de-
livered and read.236 Traditional forms of service of process—in-person, 
mail through the U.S. Postal Service, and even fax—all remit a confir-
mation that the documents have been delivered.237 Because the Mul-
lane standard does not require actual notice, a lack of confirmation that 
the text message has been read is likely not determinative.238 But, the 
inability to confirm that the defendant has received the text message is 
problematic—without the confirmation, there is no way to ascertain 
that the text message conclusively has been sent to the defendant.239 
Without this confirmation, there is no means of proving that the plain-
tiff took reasonable steps to notify the defendant; it is crucial to have 
proof that the text message was delivered effectively.240 
 Currently, some wireless service providers have applications capable 
of notifying users that a message has been delivered and read.241 Apple’s 
                                                                                                                      
eration & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (permitting service of 
process by telex message and by serving pleadings on all present counsel); In re Int’l Tele-
media Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 719–20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (permitting full service 
of process via fax, ordinary mail, and e-mail). 
235 Cf. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (emphasizing that the inability to attach documents 
in e-mails was a limitation); Colby, supra note 156, at 10 (suggesting multi-step systems to 
overcome the potential problems associated with attachments in e-mail); Hedges et al., 
supra note 3, at 72 (discussing attaching documents in the context of e-mail); Shultz, supra 
note 2, at 1527 (examining the inability to append documents to a Facebook message). 
236 Cf. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (noting the lack of confirmation in the context of e-
mail service of process); Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 66–67 (examining e-mail service); 
Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525–26 (discussing the lack of confirmation for service of process 
via Facebook). 
237 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(l) (requiring the plaintiff to submit an affidavit to the court that 
service of process has been made); Sokasits, supra note 128, at 537–38 (discussing fax ma-
chines’ confirmation pages); Add Insurance & Extra Services, U.S. Postal Service, https:// 
www.usps.com/ship/insurance-and-extra-services.htm? (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). E-mail 
may also remit a confirmation. See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text. 
238 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15, 319; cf. Colby, supra note 156, at 4–5 (noting that 
U.S. courts have not required actual receipt when determining constitutional sufficiency, 
and, therefore, that a defendant’s failure to read an e-mail containing service would not 
render the service void). 
239 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(l); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; cf. Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525–
26 (arguing that lack of confirmation features for Facebook is problematic for permitting 
service of process by Facebook but is not determinative). 
240 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; cf. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (noting the inability to 
confirm receipt of an e-mail); Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 66–67 (discussing lack of con-
firmation in the context of e-mail); Shultz, supra note 2, at 1525–26 (discussing lack of 
confirmation in the context of e-mail and Facebook). 
241 See infra notes 242–246 and accompanying text. 
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iMessage and Blackberry’s Blackberry Messenger service (“BBM”) each 
permit users to receive notifications that their message has been success-
fully delivered and has been read by the recipient.242 These services are 
limited to specific circumstances, however—iMessage can be utilized 
only by other iPhone users,243 and BBM can be utilized only by other 
Blackberry users.244 Thus, although there are systems in place that con-
firm that a text message has been received and read, there is no univer-
sal system among service providers.245 Until a universal confirmation 
system is established, the ability to use text messages for effecting service 
of process should be circumscribed.246 
 Ultimately, notwithstanding that service of process through text 
message is constitutionally sufficient, as the technology currently exists, 
it is not feasible.247 The lack of a universal system among the service 
providers to remit confirmation of receipt of a text message and the 
inability to attach documents to a text message impose the biggest limi-
tations.248 These limitations, in combination with the informality of text 
messages, caution against the widespread adoption of text message ser-
vice of process at the current time.249 
                                                                                                                      
242 Get to Know BBM, Blackberry, http://us.blackberry.com/apps-software/blackberry 
messenger/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2012); Messages, Apple, http://www.apple.com/ios/messages/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2012). WhatsApp, a “cross-platform mobile messaging app,” allows users 
to receive notifications when their message has been uploaded to the server and delivered to 
the recipient. Frequently Asked Questions, WhatsApp Inc., http://www.whatsapp.com/faq/ 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
243 Messages, supra note 242 (stating that the iMessage system can be utilized by all iOS 
devices). 
244 Get to Know BBM, supra note 242. WhatsApp allows users across service providers to 
utilize the program; however, it does require a smartphone. Frequently Asked Questions, supra 
note 242. 
245 See Get to Know BBM, supra note 242; Messages, supra note 242. 
246 Cf. Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 67 (contending that the court’s criticism in Rio 
Properties—that there is a lack of confirmation of receipt for e-mails—is no longer valid 
because a free online confirmation service is now available). 
247 See supra notes 203–246 and accompanying text. These limitations of text messages 
are not necessarily determinative if the balancing test espoused by the Ninth Circuit is 
adopted. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018. Under this balancing test, courts would weigh the 
benefits of text message service of process against the limitations, and determine whether 
in a given case, text message service should be utilized. Id. Under this balancing test, text 
message service of process, with its extensive technological limitations, may still be permit-
ted provided that the facts of the case require its use. See id.; see also Stewart & Conley, supra 
note 134, at 764–72 (outlining the factors that courts consider when deciding whether to 
authorize e-mail service of process on a foreign defendant). 
248 See supra notes 228–246 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 221–246 and accompanying text. 
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IV. Beyond Technological Limitations: A Framework for 
Granting Service by Text Message 
 Given the efficiency and constitutional sufficiency of text message 
service of process, if the technological limitations described in Part III 
are minimized, text message service should be utilized.250 There are, 
however, certain restrictions that should be imposed upon its use.251 
This Part assumes that the technological limitations of text messages— 
the inability to attach documents and the lack of confirmation proce-
dures—can be mitigated.252 Section A suggests the procedural frame-
work under which text message service of process should be permit-
ted.253 Section B then argues that text message service of process should 
be limited to service on natural persons.254 
A. Procedural Framework for Courts Analyzing Whether to 
Permit Service by Text Message 
 Courts’ analysis for permitting text message service of process 
should be analogous to the one currently used to determine the per-
missibility of e-mail service of process on a foreign defendant.255 First, 
like the procedure for e-mail service of process, plaintiffs should peti-
tion the court to serve process via text message.256 Next, when analyz-
ing whether text message service of process should be authorized, 
courts should conduct the same multifactor test for analyzing whether 
e-mail service of process on a foreign defendant should be permit-
ted.257 Under that analysis, courts look to three factors: (1) prior at-
                                                                                                                      
d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002); supra 
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oreign defendant); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2011) (permitting a court 
to o
t of Appeals for the 
 
250 See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3
es 203–249 and accompanying text. 
251 See infra notes 255–286 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 219–249 and accompanying text. 
253 See infra notes 255–273 and accompanying text 
254 See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text. 
255 See Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 764–72. 
256 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) (requiring a court order for substituted service when 
serving a f
rder substituted service of process where service under traditional methods is “imprac-
ticable”). 
257 Cf. Hedges et al., supra note 3, at 69 (arguing that the constitutional sufficiency of 
Facebook service of process turns on how frequently users check their Facebook mes-
sages); Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 764–72 (discussing the framework utilized by 
courts when determining whether a plaintiff should be permitted to serve a foreign de-
fendant by e-mail); Melodie M. Dan, Note, Social Networking Sites: A Reasonably Calculated 
Method to Effect Service of Process, 1 Case W. Res. J.L. Tech. & Internet 183, 216 (2010) 
(proposing a balancing test similar to that articulated by the U.S. Cour
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tempts by the plaintiff to serve the defendant by traditional methods of 
service; (2) the defendant’s use of e-mail for communication; and (3) 
evasion of service by the defendant.258 The first two factors are the most 
important in determining whether a court should authorize text mes-
sage service of process in a given case.259 
 The first factor—prior attempts by the plaintiff to serve the defen-
f a cell phone, and, specifi-
lly
                                                                                                                     
dant by traditional means—is important in determining whether to 
permit service of process by text message.260 Because of the limitations 
of text messages, service via text message should not be treated like the 
gold standards of service of process, such as in-person or mailed ser-
vice, which are permitted without leave of the court.261 These tradi-
tional, tried-and-true methods of service of process carry a lower risk 
that the defendant will not be apprised of the pending proceedings.262 
Therefore, those traditional methods should be attempted before text 
message service of process is employed.263 
 The second factor—defendant’s use o
ca , text messages for communication—is the most important factor in 
the court’s determination of whether service of process via text message 
should be allowed for a given defendant.264 How extensively the particu-
lar defendant utilizes a cell phone contributes directly to whether a text 
message would satisfy the Mullane test for constitutional sufficiency of 
service of process.265 The more frequently a defendant uses a cell 
phone, especially the text message feature, the more likely it is that text 
message service of process will reach the defendant.266 Should a defen-
 
Ninth Circuit in the 2002 case, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, for determin-
ing whether to authorize service of process by social networking sites). 
258 See, e.g., Colby, supra note 48, at 370–71; Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 764–
72; supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
259 Cf. Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 764–70 (discussing the analysis in the con-
text of e-mail). 
260 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); cf. Wil-
liams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231 F.R.D. 483, 486–88 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (authorizing service of 
process via e-mail due to the plaintiff’s extensive efforts to serve the defendants prior to 
the motion). 
261 Compare supra notes 67–70, 105–111 and accompanying text (discussing in-person 
and mailed service of process), with supra notes 219–249 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the limitations of text messages as methods for service of process). 
262 See Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 764–67. 
263 Id. 
264 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Stewart & Conley, supra note 134, at 767–70. 
265 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (stating that the standard is whether a method of service 
of process is reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the pending proceedings). 
266 See id. 
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dant seldom use a cell phone, text message service of process will most 
likely fail Mullane’s “reasonably calculated” requirement.267 
 Further, it should be determined whether the cell phone number 
identified by the plaintiff can actually be linked to the defendant.268 
Although the plaintiff may have a particular cell phone number for the 
defendant, it does not mean that the defendant can still be reached at 
that number.269 Again, proof that the defendant currently uses a given 
cell phone number is important for determining whether service of 
process via text message is reasonably calculated and should be permit-
ted by the courts.270 
 When text message service of process is authorized, it should be 
one method among many that the court orders.271 In permitting ser-
vice of process under substituted methods, courts usually order service 
of process by multiple methods.272 The use of multiple methods of ser-
                                                                                                                      
267 Cf. id. at 318 (permitting service of process by publication when the defendants’ 
names and addresses were unknown, but finding that service by publication did not satisfy 
the reasonably calculated standard when the defendant’s names and addresses were known). 
268 Cf. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Aliaga, 272 F.R.D. 617, 620–21 
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (authorizing service of process by e-mail on one defendant because there 
was a link between him and two e-mail addresses, but declining to permit e-mail service as 
to the other defendant because the plaintiff could only demonstrate the e-mail address was 
linked to the defendant’s husband); Pfizer Inc. v. Domains by Proxy, No. Civ.A.3:04 CV 
741(SR), 2004 WL 1576703, at *1–2 (D. Conn. July 13, 2004) (declining to permit service 
of process by e-mail, in part because the plaintiff provided six possible e-mail addresses for 
the defendants, demonstrating that the e-mail addresses were not sufficiently linked to the 
defendants to meet the Mullane standard); Shultz, supra note 2, at 1526 (arguing that a 
potential difficulty in permitting service of process via Facebook is linking a particular 
profile to the defendant). 
269 Cf. Shultz, supra note 2, at 1526 (discussing linking a Facebook profile to a particu-
lar individual). 
270 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 318; cf. Shultz, supra note 2, at 1526–27 (noting that 
one major difficulty for permitting Facebook service of process is proving that a particular 
profile is the defendant’s). 
271 Cf. Chanel, Inc. v. Zhixian, No. 10-CV-60585, 2010 WL 1740695, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 29, 2010) (permitting e-mail service of process, but requiring service by publication as 
well given the limitations of e-mail); In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 719–
20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (ordering process to be served by fax, ordinary mail, and e-
mail); Dan, supra note 257, at 216 (arguing that if service of process is permitted via social 
networking sites, it should be combined with other inexpensive and reliable methods of 
service); Shultz, supra note 2, at 1527–28 (stating that if service through Facebook is cou-
pled with other methods of service of process, the likelihood that it is constitutionally suf-
ficient increases). 
272 See, e.g., New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission 
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Int’l Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 720. 
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vice makes it more likely that notice will reach the defendant, and, 
therefore, makes the notice more reasonably calculated.273 
B. Limits on the Entities Permitted to Be Served by Text Message 
 Text message service of process should be used only for serving 
natural persons, not business entities.274 Whereas many businesses have 
a distinct business e-mail address, which its customers can use to contact 
the business, businesses do not typically have a designated cell phone 
number.275 Moreover, due to the massive size of some corporations, ser-
vice of process by text message is arguably not reasonably calculated to 
apprise those entities of the proceedings against them.276 By contrast, 
there is a direct link between an individual and a cell phone—if some-
one wants to reach an individual directly, they will dial that person’s cell 
phone number.277 
 The only way that a business entity could be served by text message 
using a cell phone is if states adopted provisions similar to South Caro-
lina’s e-mail service of process statute.278 Under that framework, enti-
ties incorporated in the state would be required to register a cell phone 
number with the Secretary of State.279 Text message service of process 
under this framework would amount to consent to service of process by 
                                                                                                                      
273 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; cf. New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 81 (ordering ser-
vice of process by telex message to the defendants in Farsi and English, and serving a copy 
of the pleadings on all counsel that appeared on behalf of the defendants); In re Int’l Tele-
media, 245 B.R. at 720 (ordering service of process via fax, ordinary mail, and e-mail); 
Shultz, supra note 2, at 1527–28 (stating that coupling Facebook with other methods of 
service increases the likelihood that it will satisfy due process requirements). 
274 See infra notes 275–281 and accompanying text. 
275 Compare Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (noting that the defendant had a business e-
mail address that was its primary contact method), with Contact, Apple, http://www.apple. 
com/contact/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (indicating that their customer service numbers 
are toll-free rather than cell phones). Companies typically use toll-free numbers and land-
lines for customer service interactions. See, e.g., Contact, supra; Technical Support for HP Prod-
ucts, HP.com, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/contact-hp/phone-assist.html (last visited Oct. 
29, 2012). 
276 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
277 See Local Number Portability, supra note 207. 
278 See supra notes 156–167 and accompanying text; cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 26-9-190 
(2007) (permitting service of process by e-mail where an entity has registered an e-mail 
address with the Secretary of State); Colby, supra note 156, at 7–9 (discussing the legislative 
developments for electronic service of process, specifically e-mail, in South Carolina under 
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act). 
279 Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 26-9-190 (allowing service of process by e-mail on an entity 
that has registered an e-mail address with the Secretary of State); Colby, supra note 156, at 
7–8 (discussing the requirements for serving a business by e-mail under section 26-6-190). 
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text message.280 In essence, by registering a cell phone number with the 
Secretary of State, the entity meets two requirements for permitting 
service of process by text message—the entity’s use of a cell phone for 
communications and a link between the cell phone number and the 
entity.281 
 Thus, should courts permit text message service of process after 
technological advancements make it feasible, such service should have 
three stringent restrictions.282 First, service by text message should re-
quire a court order.283 Second, it should be subjected to the same analy-
sis as serving a foreign defendant by e-mail.284 This analysis requires 
inquiry into the other methods of service the plaintiff has attempted, 
how often the defendant uses a cell phone, and how elusive the defen-
dant has been.285 Third, service of process through text message should 
only be used for natural persons; corporations should not be served by 
text message.286 
Conclusion 
 With technology quickly advancing, courts have begun to incorpo-
rate contemporary technology into their procedures. As individuals 
become more transient and their ability to elude service of process be-
comes easier, courts will need to open themselves to electronic meth-
ods of service of process. Given that over eighty percent of adults in the 
United States own a cell phone, courts should actively seek to utilize the 
technology that cell phones offer. Text messages offer the ability to 
serve process on individuals efficiently and cost-effectively. They also 
provide a way to serve individuals who are difficult to locate and do not 
have access to the Internet. Despite these advantages, text messages 
contain substantial limitations that caution against their use as the 
technology currently stands. These limitations include their informality, 
lack of receipt confirmation, and the inability to attach documents. 
 Once the technology advances to minimize these limitations, how-
ever, courts should grant plaintiffs the ability to serve process via text 
                                                                                                                      
280 Cf. Colby, supra note 156, at 9 (arguing that the South Carolina provisions amount 
to corporations consenting to be served by e-mail should they do business in the State of 
South Carolina). 
281 See supra notes 264–270 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra notes 255–281 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra notes 256, 260–263 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra notes 255–259 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra notes 255–273 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 274–281 and accompanying text. 
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message under certain circumstances. In determining whether to per-
mit text message service of process, courts should apply the same analy-
sis as is used for e-mail service of foreign defendants: (1) whether other 
traditional methods of service of process have been utilized; (2) whether 
text messages are frequently used by the defendant, including proving 
that the cell phone number belongs to the defendant; and (3) whether 
the defendant has evaded service of process. Even when courts grant 
text message service of process, this approach should be combined with 
other methods of service to ensure that notice is reasonably calculated. 
 Ultimately, given the pervasiveness of cell phone and text message 
use, text message service of process offers a unique opportunity to min-
imize the costs associated with the “gold standard” of personal service 
and simultaneously ensure actual notice. When the limitations of text 
message technology have been eliminated and certain circumstances 
are met, courts should permit a “you’ve been served” text message. 
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